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Tape IV, pl 
SE.5SION II: Friday, July 11, 1975, 6:45p11 
Site: Board Roe■, Sea Pines Plantation, Hilton Head Island, s.c. 
All same present 
JM - I am curious about one little situation that was alluded to this morning, 
and that is how Jerry Waldie comes off as a kind of good ~ in this 
deal in that Caldwell and others are communicating with him? 
CB - I spoke to him one time. 
WF - I was talking to hi■ about what. a good looking chick there was in the 
third row back there. 
JM - Somehow I had the Salle recollection that Caldwell does - that is either 
Jerry and I were walking over talking about us getting together with 
the lowest coDBOn denominator idea, or that maybe it was after you 
spoke to Jerry that you came over and said, "Maybe I ought go and meet 
or something," and had I known that , I llight have been suspicious. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - Those guys were so anxious to get an article of impeachllent they would 
take it any Wtrf they could get it. Waldie and that crowd were ready' 
to impeach Nixon on November 7, 1972. 
HF - 1 69. 
WF - '68, I guess, yeah, right after the election. 
WC - That probabl7 revealed wisdom. 
CB - One of the remarkable things was that all of tbose gentlemen had such 
restraint when they got on national television. 
HF - Was there some control? Did the word go out that Drinan and Conyers 
and those guys were supposed to be quiet during this thing? 
JM - It wasn't expressed in our pre-sence, but I have got the dirtinct i~ 
pression that there must have been a little rump session somewhere 
with Rodino maybe, putting Conyers particularly and one or two others 
under control. 
WF - I think the others were pretty much capable of exercising some 
discretion. Except. Drinan, and the guy they were more fearful of 
than a.nyb~ else, Seiberling, because he has got diarhea of the 
mouth. 
Jllt - Exactly. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - He can't stop when he gets started, and he doesn't know where he is 
going to end up anymore than a man in the moon. You can have a full-
grown idea in John Seiberling, vhere he knows exactly what he is 
supposed to do with it, and he will be turned aoound 180 degrees in 
three seconds, won't he? 
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JM - Yes. 
HF - It is very obviows to me, particularly on article II, that the deal wa:, 
that if any Republican wanted to talk in favor of it, you'ld get recog-
nition to focus attention on our side, and build up •••• 
JM - I don't think that Barbara Jordan was ever a problem. She was moderate 
in the whole matter. I think Wrangle might have had a little talking to. 
WF - Rodino thought we were getting a few too man,y cruies at the time. 
Barbara, I think, probably understood the political maneuvering better 
than Charlie (?] did, don't you? She is pretty much of a pro, she 
undertands what you' re trying to do and we were trying to la7 our stoey 
out where it would be understood by the people. She understood that. 
JM - I think there is one interesting aspect in this matter that is probably 
worthy or noting. That is one where Walter has the same feeling, and 
Ray too, altho we did not communicate to the same e.egree. In the early 
stages, I can't say whether this was before or after October 23, and 
the Democrats met one or more times in EF 100 [?] when Rodino issued 
the statement that it was unanimous, and there hadn't been any vote 
taken, as 1ou know. But rq recollection at that point of 'tq own feel-
ings, and I expressed it, I remember, to Barbara and Ed Mesvinsk:y in 
front of the Longworth Building one day, s87ing, "lie were engaged in an 
exercise or futility. We are not going to be able to develop the evidence 
and we lllight make fools of ourselves." I don't think I added that last 
sentence, but I implied that. And I think 1ou and I had an exchange of 
a similar nature somewhere along the line, Walter. 
WF - Especially the way the wanted to head out on it, and I think then Rodino 
understood that, don't you? For shortly aft.er that meeting, the likes 
of that did not happen again. 
RT - That is true. 
JM - That was sort of a one-shot when he had all the Democrats together in 
EF 100, and there would have been no gunbelt. [?] 
'-'F - This was shortly after the whole mess had been referred to the Judiciary 
Committee and there was no real action taken and he vas trying to get 
some sort of consen9Us to start. Those gtJY'S were ready to vote the 
articles right then and there, weren't they? With virtuall.7 not very 
much else done. Isn't that about how you remember it? 
RT - Yes, in part, but I think the meeting was more procedural: how did we 
go? what steps do we take? There was seine thought, I believe, that the 
committee could just move right ahead and start hearing the witneeses. 
WF - You know, they wanted to set up a task -force with Drinan goin' all over 
the field and shoot.in' somewhere. 
UOOHTER. 
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RT - There was an excess there about expressing that ve were in agreement. I 
think the agreement vas that an inquiry did need to begin, an orderly 
inquiry, and I believe there was a consesnus among you and Walter and I 
that that was an appropriate course of action. 
WF - But not a "task force." 
CB - The thing I had difficulty with vas envisioning anybody with a master 
plan at the beginning to have it go along. Both of these publications 
[Whitte and Breslin] indicate that Rodino or o•Neil had a master plan. 
I just don't, in the first place, think Rodino for all of his charm, 
had that good a mind. 
WF - It was 110re reaction than action? It was far 110re stops aIXi stances 
and so on than planning. It was fortuitous events on top of each other. 
CB - All together, 1es. And our getting together was only under the pressure 
of time. 
JM - Rodino, of course, came out of the matter a whole lot better than any-
body would have ever predicted. 
WF - No question of that. 
JM - As for his apparent leadership ability in matters of concern, initially 
I think that can be attributed to an abundance of caution, after that 
first injudicious statement in EB 100. He showed after that great care 
in the selection of the general counsel. 
TR - Yes, I think you are right. 
JM - It took hil1 two months or more to selct a general counsel. 
TR - It was slow motion. 
JM - Yes, it was frustrating. 
WF - Can you imagine the kind of help he had before that in Jerry Ziefman, 
though? 
JM - Well, not much. But it really came off at that point as a kind of lack 
of leadership ability, but it kind or turned as time went along. 
HF - I had t~ impression that Peter played it very close to the chest thruout 
'73, and I once asked Jerry Zie!man to list for me one one page 20 or 30 
threshold issues that only he and the chairman had consulted about to 
decide whether or not the full eonaittee would ~ider as the ad hoc 
committee referred to or as a subcommittee, or . just how to go about 
this, for there was no book which said "how to impeach." He had a 
lot of decisions before he got involved with the whole committee. 
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WF - All during that period when he and Hutchinson were going thr.l the trans-
cripts hours and hours each day, it kind of boggles the mind - them not 
communicating at all, doesn't it? 
LAUGRI'ER. 
CB - And those insidiou., re11arks .about the Italian-Americans, you know. 
RT - It's been mentioned on numerous. occasions, but I think desen-es repetition 
here, that one of the key- decisions made by the leadership vas to have 
the inqllll'7 conducted by the Judiciary Committee, rather than forming a 
special blue ribbon collllnittee for that purpose. It may well be that by 
letting that burden fall on a committee which was not speci!ically 
selected for that purpose, 7ou got 8.JIIOng that committee a group of 
people who approached the proble■ as those here and so■e others on the 
committee did appraoch it - namel7, trying to do so objectively. I 
think that was possibl7 one of the key- decisions of the entire process. 
JM - I don't think we can overemphasize two things: one, the fact that 
Rodino did not do arrr arm-twisting with the individual members or the 
colllllittee to '1111' knowledge, and two, that the Democrats did not act -i 
in concert on but very, very few issues - the only one I can reall7 
recall is when we recessed the meeting and went back and had a little 
brain session and came back and voted the other way. Btrt. otherwise not. 
WF - We were not in concert even then; I was on the other side of that issue. 
JM ~ Yes, but. it was about. the only part of the ."plan" that I can recall. 
WF - It was a 20 to 18 Tote. 
JM - Now 7ou Republicans had a little difficulty understanding that. 
TR - Well, I will tell you, Jia, that is not exactly right. There were some 
procedural things where we got into fights about •••• 
HF - Early on, too. 
WC - Let me tell 1'011 that I think Rodi.no al110st blew it one tiae. That was 
at the beginning o! the iuue of St. Clair's participation in the 
sessions. You recall that was Tery crucial as far as the Republicans 
were concerned. The Democrats mostly said at that time that St .Clair 
can't come in, 7ou can't cross-examine. That issue erupted. Well, 
Peter was outside the speaker's lobby one time and advised me that 
they were not going to allow St .Clair to actively participate and I 
said, "Well, Peter, if you take that position, yuu had better forget 
about. any bi-partisan approach to this whole thing." 
TR - Sure. 
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we - And he said, "I! yuu say that, Bill, if you take that action, then this 
will aaount to a coverup of a coverup." And I said, "Peter, if you say 
that publically, it is all over for this whole procedure." And he went 
back to his office, and I don't know who he talked to at that point, 
but St.Clair was thereafter allowed. 
WF - That is exactly what I mean by some of his doings were real.ly a reaction 
from your pressure, like our pressure on the witnesses: we're going to 
stick with four witnesses, and by God, nothing e1.se. That was it. I 
called him, "To hell with that!" I was going to scream to high heaven 
about it. 
TR - That's right, and I went up to a press conference with MeClory. It was 
a very placid, tranquil conference until Peter called on me and I just 
raised hell. He was going to let him call four witnesses. I ju.st 
jumped all onr m.... It was a one-man subpoena. It was letting our 
guy go along and they- take ~epositions - that was another one. 
WC - Not calling Colson. 
iiF - Not calling Colson - that got to be the issue. I just heard on the radio 
a minute ago that Alexander Butterfield was a CIA plant in the White 
House. 
HF - Could not have been a better located fellow. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - I never got to where I really understood, though, what vas his moti-
vation was, because he had stooled - there is no question about it 
he stooled on 'em. I am not saying that he didn't tell the truth, 
but he's a stoolie. 
CB - I don't think that's fair. I think the guy was a messenger boy and he 
answered every question they asked him and didn't volunteer a]Vthing. 
JM - Let me get something of! my chest, because frankly I think the partisan-
ship issue is of importance historieall7 here. 
TR - Yeah, I do too. 
JM - Before get ti.cg back to it, which I will do very qu:i.ckly, I want to say 
this about my dealings with Rodino. Rodino was i?1T0lved during ·1ast 
two or three weeks with me in one private conversation, that was on a 
Sunda,- morning. McClor;y, Rodino, Dear, Frank Polk, and you, Tom? 
TM - No, I wasn't there. 
JM - OK, you weren't there. We tried to kick of! the final polishing of 
article II. 
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WF - That was after we voted on article I. 
JM - Yes, it was Sunday morning at 10:00. We met in my office; McClory and 
Rodino each stayed only about ten or .fifteen minutes. Then they left. 
We had a brief general discussion about where we were heading and the 
general agreement and then they left. That was the only input Rodino 
personally' ever had with me in this article preparation I did, unless 
it was in a meeting in which he may have expressed an opinion somewhere 
along the line, which I don't think he did. 
But now, let me insult you. I started to ask earlier today if you -
and I will refer to you as Republicans - were to go back and review 
your votes on the procedural issues, would you vote the same today? 
Now, I'll tell you I would, and I will also tell you that I cast one 
partisan vote during that whole time, otherwise I thuught I was casting 
· the logical, co11111on-sense, procedurally efficient Tote. There was 
not more than one damn one that was partisan. And my attitude about 
your position, and that is the one we talked about when we went out 
and came back and changed the vote for some damn reason. I changed my 
vote, and that was a~_political vote , the only one I can remember cast-
ing. But I remember saying to friends and to myself: it is mighty 
easy to play minority politics, because if you are the minority, you 
can take a partisan position beca~e you are the underdog. The Presi-
dent is the underdog. And you can get away with it. But as a majority, 
we cannot get away with it. 
CB - We could, that's true. 
JM - That's right. We get criticized harshly, and can better belive that 
I looked for a reason to vote with -the minority on everyone of those 
procedural votes, but lt;Y common seru,e would not let me do it. 
TR - Well, let me just list a few. You know, I agree with you on one: I 
think I would change my vote, but there are some •••• 
CB - Which one are you talking about? 
WF - Where you were standing alone, that ' s where. 
TR - But starting out, the very first order of business, was a terrible, 
terrible mistake in my opinion on Rodino' s part and on the part of' the 
Democrats. And I don't mean that against you personally, but I think 
it was a mistake, and that is where he came in requesting one man 
subpoena power. 
HF - That's right. 
TR - That was the first order of business, the press jumped on, we jumped on. 
It was a straigth party line vote. The second one, abolishing the notice 
requirement for holding meetings, there were 48 hours under the Hungate 
rule. They tried to abolish that. We had fights on St.Clair's par-
ticipation. I certainly would vote the same way. 
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WF - You didn't havea vote on St.Clair's participation. 
TR - Yeah, I know thi:,. 
WF - We were with you all the way. 
TR - I know you were. We had plenty debate about it, and I had discussions 
with Peter Rodino. 
WC - The questiorus of whether he could also go the depositiorus •••• 
TR - That is another one. 
CB - They abandoned depositiorus, so that wouldn't be •••• 
TR - Probably one of the biggest mistakes wa:, his adallant position on calling 
four witnesses, instead of letting St.Clair leeway. I voted with you, 
but St.Clair was, in 'lfI1 opinion, just completel)r reasonable on everything 
he did. He didn't want much time, he took two hours when they took, 
hell, I don't know how JDaIV hours presenting their thing. St.Clair was, 
I thought, just, and then when he did finally get hi:, right to call wit-
ne:,:,es, he called eight or something like that. We will go back and there 
were lllaDY', many- points. I'll tell 7ou, Peter Rodino, to his credit, 
and all of 7ou gu;r:,, and Walter aJ.aost always, and the se~ible Democrats 
backed off on procedural questions. 
WC - It's true. 
iiF - That is why it was so dumb to get wrapped up in thelR. 
TR - You were smart enough to see when it was gonna be a real dispute. It 
could haTe been a part7 thing. 
RT - Quite the contraey. 
WF - That's the worst thing in the world for rq political position, and I 
krn:,w for Ray and Jim too. 
JM - The more strong~ parti:,an 7ou were the less ;you wanted it to appear so. 
TR - Yeah. The right to cross-examine was another one. I got into it with 
Kastenmeier whether we meant that. when we questioned the right to cross--
examine (?]. I argued that we did, because I'd asked Jenner, "Does that 
statement. have an;ything in there that prevents a person from cro:,s-
examining?" He said, "0:f' course not." 
iiF - You all think that our staff did what they should have in the way of 
investigation? 
TR - Not at all. 
CB - They didn't have enough manpower. 
LAUGHTER. 
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WC - Virtually nothing. 
WF - Compared with what the Senate did in about the same amount of time, you 
know, thank God that the Senate cut the mustard, because we borrowed of 
their investigative work all the v3.7, all the way. 
WC - The fact of the matter is, there would never ha Te been an impeachment 
process if you didn't have the Senate's work. 
WF - And the tapes. 
WC - And Sirica, because what other judge would have given out 3 5 year· . 
provisional sentences provided you talk - not too U1JY' that I a■ aware or. 
iiF - You all remember the matter that preceded impeachment tr! think had 
something to do with the ultimate outcome. And I'm going to make myself 
a hero here, but Jill just got caught in the crack t~. I refer to 
the matter of the Hungate subcoimd.ttee trying to backtrack on Jaworski. 
You reme■ber that? The committee voted on partisan lines except me 
voting with 7ou geys, 20 to 18, to report out & bill that would have re-
quired a new special prosecutor. 
RT - A court-appointed special prosecutor. 
WF - Which in effect would have voted Jaworski out, and they neyer even 
brought it up. 
WC - Well, I don't want to eng&ge in any self-hypotheosis either, but you inay 
recall it did come out of the full committee to go to the House. 
WF - It w&s neTer brought up in the House. 
we - No, but they passed it out of our committee, it went to the House. 
And I had the opportunity to write an article which the ~ printed, 
and wrote an editorial one or two days before it came out, saying, "Don't 
do it, don't put a new man in." M;7' reasons were entirel.7 different. 
I had been talking with Elliot Richardson, cmove him in from his house 
one day to downtown, and asked him about what the situation was with 
Jaworski. What had happend was that the White House originally' intended 
when they fireci Richardson and got. rid of Cox and Ruckelshaus, they 
expected Peterson and Bork to take over the prosecution. And when that 
didn't fl7 after about two days of public vitriol being expressed, they 
decided they had to come up with some gey. They picked Jaworski rlth 
a long, safe tradition, head of the A.BA, president or the .ABA, chances 
are, representing a lot of corporate fat. 
WF - A wolf in sheep's clothing. 
WC - OK, when they appointed him, the7 expec~ed him to, can all of Cox's men. 
He didn't do that, so once he came in, he then became the captive of 
Cox's staff, and that is why the White House was upset with him. They 
expected hint to fire everybody, bring in his own people and start fresh. 
So now he couldn't back away from aey issue that Cox had begun without 
them blowing the whistle. So the White House wanted him out, and that 
is the article that I wrote for the Post, saying why you shouldn't create 
a new special prosecutor. 
,. 
Tape I.V, p9 
WF - We gould've gotten bogged down and fighting over Jaworski and it would 
have taken the steaa out of the impeachment inquiry about the same time, 
becamse this was the !all o! '73. 
HF - On these procedural issues, and even the more substantive iss1Jes, for 
example in trying to respond to the edited White H~e transcripts and 
so forth, it was the Republicans who were meeting periodical.17, almost 
weekly, and except !or the four of us, I think it should be noted, the 
pressure, the intensity or reeling, on the part. o! every other Republican 
there, including those like Hogan and Froelich, vas very inteMe to the 
point when you just don't want to participate in the discussion, but I 
remember Bill and I as late as May- 1st felt so. 
JM - Correct me if I'm wrong, but we didn't have caucuses on these pro-
cedural issues. 
RT - That's correct. 
JM - They were spontanecua· on our part. The only one was the time we re-
cessed, as I've said. 
TR - No, I'll bet you on that. 
JM - All right. 
CB - But Jim, you don't need to have a caucus when your invading army is 
overruning the continent. Everybody- knows you are going to follow it. 
To say it wasn't part of the motivation I'd have to doubt. 
JM - No, that• s not true. Pm saying that I don't think that Walter and Ray-
and I were partisan motivated on the procedural votes. 
TR - No, I am not saying that. 
JM - I would bet I could take and win, before an impartial jury, on the issue 
o! the subpoena power. 
TR - I don't know. 
JM - I do. 
CB - What the question there was, do you want to give the minority the 
right, Ed Hutchinson, to subpoena anybody he wanted to, unlim:ited. It 
might make a good trial out of the power of investigation. That was the 
alternative. 
WC - No, it wasn't. 
TR - No. The majority overruled. 
JM - What difference does that make - or the entire committee doing the 
subpoening, what' s the difference? 
TR - We will have Mooney go over these procedural points and list thein a·nd 
I'll tell you, it wasn't all the Republicans who were W;t"Ong. I thought 
we were wrong on open meetings. Weren't we for opening it all up? 
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WC - Yes, but for a different reason. 
TR - We were demogogues. I was wrong in the letter[?]. You [CB] were the 
only one who suppo:gted that. 
CB - Don't get into that. That was the dumbest thing I ever heard of; who 
ever heard or writing a letter to a judge? You ain't doing right. 
TR - No, no, then we wrote a letter to Nixon. 
CB - I knov. Who ever heard of a court writing a letter to a litigant. There 
ain't no such animal. Who ever heard of it? 
TR - Wall, I will tell you the reason: we wanted to bend OYer backwards to be 
fair. 
CB - No, the reason was we did not ha-re enough evidence to charge him with a:t'J7 
official failure to measure up to our requirements·, so had to do it 
infoniall7. 
TR - Oh, no. 
JM - I had one basic hangup about the matter. I was looking !or an objective '. 
investigation, and ;you were all looking for a trial, that was the difference. 
TR - No. 
WF - What could haTe done and might have done at tbe point when we wrote the 
letter is cite !'or contempt. 
CB - Yeah, you do or you don't. 
WF - But it would never have had to come to that. 
TR - Cony-ers wanted to do that. 
JM - It would haTe had the effect of straightening out the problem with the 
executi Te branch as it was then. And it would haTe been on the basis of 
the !acts as opposed to some procedural basis like the contempt of Congress. 
TR - But, Jim, you do not start out that way. It is not whether Hutchinson has 
the power, it is whether Rodino show have it unil~rail.T• 
HF - Solely. 
TR - Sure, you' re trying to conrtnce the American public this guy- should be 
given a legitimate, !air inquiry. So you give a Democratic chairman 
who's met with Albert and Tip O'Neil, the power to start an impeachment 
inquicy. And 7ou don't abolish the notice requirement !or holding 
meetings. That sounds terrible. 
r, 
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JM - or course, it did to the layman. And you all acted like lB7J1en. 
TR - And so you don't do it. 
LAUGHTER. 
WC - This is more heated than the real time. 
LAUGHI'ER. 
RT - As a matter of interest, it seems to me that we haTe proTen by this dis-
cussion that it is easier to disagree on procedural or real.17 super!'icial 
points than on matters of real substance as to whether or not the 
President was guilty. 
CB - But the hang-up was Peter Rodino, who was basically saying, "Trust me, 
fellers." And it was so much easier tor the Democrats to trust him 
than tor us. 
JM - Well, that uy- be. 
CB - That was rq hang-up. 
TR - Sure. 
JM - Don't think that I don't understand the situation, but or course we will 
recall that it required consultation with Hutchinson, and a right or 
appeal to the collllittee, as I recall. 
It' 
VF -/Hutchinson disagreed, it would go to the connittee. 
HF - That• s right - a eoaprold.se, that's what came out. 
TR - That was not the initial proposal. 
HF - Only art.er we had a part7-line vote on the joint power. 
TR - Everything was comprem:i.sed. 
CB - It was a procedural point, if we didn't win that •••• 
WF - I don't blame you all for ha.Ting your hesitation in May- or April, or 
whenever this wa~, about Rodino. But 7ou wouldn't haYe had the same 
hesitation on July 26? For by then you knew where he stood, and he stood 
with us. 
I , 
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HF - We might just conteaplate what dif"!erence it is now !r011 a year ago: 
two to one plus one - there is a lot of difference between that and 
21 to 17. 
JM - There sure is. 
TR - Peter was trying to control the crazies. 
CB - I don't think the satter would have been referred to the present co1D-
mittee, do you? 
HF - It might have been. But the Republicans would not have been shown all 
these considerations. 
CB - Well, I !eel that ~ow it is not that representative of enn the whole body. 
SL - What i! Cellar had still been chairllan? 
WF -
WC - What i! Jack Brooks had been chairllan? /If Cellar had been chair21an, it 
don't think he would have brought it along. He would ha.Te stilled it 
somehow or another. I don't think he ever thought that Hixon should have 
been i.Jlpeached. What do you all think? 
TR - I just saw him the other night. He is looking senile. Good ga:r. 
LAUGHTER. 
WC - A. Railsback remark. 
00 - On that autobiographical remark [TR - That was great, thank you. J, I 
would like to make one more c011111ent. Do you recall that in most or 
your interrlews, I told that little analogy- of Lincoln saying that 
if you want to stop religion or a church - well, this is the time to 
give the credit to the real author, Ray Thornton. Tell 'em right. 
APPLAUSE. 
RT - If you want to stop the construction or a church, don't start an argument 
with the religion, but over the location o! the building. 
Jl5 - We showed that again tonight. Shall we adjourn? You know the agenda for 
tomorrow. 
END OF TAPE IV AND OF SE.5SION II. 
/ ,, 
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\ t f 
Tape V, pl 
Pe!"sons present and site - same. 
Time: Saturday, July 12, 1975, 9:30am 
JM - I mentioned yesterday that I'd had this 'Winthrop College professor, Bill 
Blunt, whoa I'd borrowed .from Tom Geddes, helping me, and a.a Valter 
mentioned, he was vith us for lunch on that Satm-day after that more or 
less ineffective meeting of the Judiciary Committee, getting ready for 
the hearings the following week. I guess it was about th.at time that I 
got h:iJI and John La.bowicz on the impeachment staff' working on articles. 
Now I apologize to the group for not having brought with me and not having 
locaited the file which he kept and which I instructed him to prepare and 
consolidate and make notes on and deliver to me, which he did. It was 
then packaged in -, impeachment material. I instructefi rq Greenville 
staff to go thru that material and get out what appeared to be rq personal 
notes, and I went by to pick them up last week, and found they were in 
avery small r0011, boxes stacked upon boxes, and not a damn thing located 
- just eveeything open. I just d.idn 't have the time nor the strength nor 
the arrangement to try to find it, so I am rel.7ing on independent recol-
lection, when I real.17 owe it ta,;you to review s011e of those notes. I 
called him this morning, and he will call me back in the next ten lllinutes. 
I don't know whether he kep acy extra copies of certain things or will 
be able to confina his and 'flIY' belief that we did hAve an article II ready 
on Tuesday morning .when we met in Railsback' s office. There was some 
type of article II in addition to article I that had been prepared. Bill 
Cohen's recolletion about turning them in is of course accurate, and 
those extra copies are no doubt in my files, and I a11 sorrr I don't have 
them here. 
CB - I thought Mooney had all those. 
TM - At first we started, on article I, numbering the drafts and signing them 
and so forth, and frankly tha£ fell thru after about the t..lu±d or fourth 
meeting. They vere beir,.g passed out, some of them vould be returned, 
some wouldn't be returned, and some were handing them back and not sigl".ing 
them - we got pretty well mixed up a couple of times. 
JM - You will recall, ve did not locate the article I that I brought to the 
meeting on Tuesday morning, but Bill Blunt and I are of the opinion that 
we would be able to locate it in the files he left me. Now I cannot b:, 
looking at these drafts : put them in chronological order; somehow this one 
that we have marked here "third dra.rt" is .first, in 'flrY' notebook. 
TR - Mooney, how did you assign the draft numbers? 
TM - I just assumed that the Donahue draft is not the first dra!t, that is 
what he dropped in on Wednesday, thinking that there had to be something 
before that. 
JM - That's correct. Bill Blunt and I, in m;y recollection, on Tuesday night 
put together wh~t was probably the Donahue substitute that I might h~ve 
finished •••• 
TR - It wasn't the substitute, it was the original. 
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JM - That's right. 
TM - In your book, it is number 2. The Donahue draft is 2. This may be what 
you handed out Wednesday, before we went into the committee room at 7:30. 
JM - Yes, that was on the bottom of the resolutions, wasn't it? 
TM - About ahlf an hour before that you did hand us something. 
JM - Well, I don't recall. 
TM - You gave it to us somehat reluctantly, as I remember. You were not sure 
that you wanted to do that. You did say, "Here is a rough draft of article 
II." 
JM - All right. General.ly you will notice these drafts do have a date and later 
on, as things heated up, a time. That indicates that they were done at the 
impeachment staff offices. John Labowicz and Bill Blunt, after going over 
the latest draft with me in my office when I wouid return fro■ one of our 
meetings, would then go over to the impeachment headquarters. John Doar 
and I had frequent discussions as I brought back fro11 you any sugge"Stions 
pertaining to eliminations. He would try. to implement. I never had any 
problem with hill asserting ~elf on aey points, except one or two iso-
lated ones, like we discovered yesterday on that business of making "his 
policy," certain things that he considered essential to sustain the level 
of an impeachable offense. Bat basically it just was drafting. One 
other ujor point of difference that he and I maintained throughout was 
the question of the inclusion of the subpoena contempt as part of article 
II, rather than as a separate article. As I recall, that was the only 
point of dtl'!erence that was ever discussed with any other group, and it 
was mentioned once or twice at the time of the little Democratic caucus 
meetings in Ziefaan's office. I remember one ma.orning in particular, in 
giving a progress report, there was . concern how that should be handled 
and his opinion whether it should be second [? J. 
WF - We all wanted it to be a part of II also, even you, Ray. 
RT - Oh, yes. 
WF - Even tho you ended up voting !or it as article III. 
RT - Yes, at the time of the vote, I expressed a preference that it be in-
serted as part of article II. 
JM - Well, that is not exactly correct. I'd say we wanted it to be a part of 
article II, but you were prepared to strike it earlier. You recall the 
first day we had a discssion, you [WF] and Ray in particular. 
31' - I think that may be right. We didn't like it at all. 
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JM - That's why' I finally gave in frankly, because I knev that even tho you all 
were going to vote on the article, you were unhappy. 
RT - The indication vas that you would vote for articlce II whether or not that 
addition was included. 
TR - Exactl.J'. I could have supported it, with it or not. 
JM - Your position on that finally caused me to make a separate article. 
WC - It rea.l.17 belonged as part or I rather than of II. 
RT - You're correct - the obstruction or justice. But the discW1sion was 
whether to add it to article II. 
TR - That's right. But I think that at one point, we did discu:ss making it 
part or the Watergate coverup. 
WC - That's right. When it came up !or debate during MeClory's article III, 
I believe, Ray, you said something and I said something at that time that 
we were supporting an amendment on the noor or something to that effect 
- to have it included in article I or II, and not as a separate article. 
RT - That's right, but I would haYe still supported it as a separate article. 
WC - That's right, you did say that during the debate. 
TR - I just felt that we had not exhuasted our proper remedies to enforce the 
power that we had, there were also other measures. 
HF - Do you still .feel that way? 
TR - Yes, I do. 
[? ]- I am not sure that I do a?V110re. 
[Mr. Mann takes telephone call]. 
TR - For the record, let me just state that I felt there were certain customary, 
tradition.al procedures that the House had available to it to enforce sub-
poenas, and also to enforce eoaplianee with subpoenas, and they involved 
letting a t:flT come before the Holl5e with an attorney to eon.front the body-. 
CB - What you call due process. 
TR - Yeah, due process. And the other part of it was executive pritllege. 
I thought that we had a right probably to go into court and I thought 
that it would have sustained the House in its attempt to get that material 
against the argument of executiYe privilege, but I thought the Presidnet 
had a right to assert that. 
WF - Well, I didn't support anything to do with it, but I initially felt that 
we did not eler.1te it to that status because we should have even cited 
him for contempt for failure to compl~ or we should have gone to the 
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WF - Congress and gotten the authority, rather than the courts; we were realiJr ~ 
acting with Rodino' s subpoena, and it wasn't the whole Congress speaking 
except b7 agency there. 
TR - That's right. 
CB - We wrote him a letter. 
TR - That doesn't make a:rq differnce. 
WF - I retrospect, I think I would say that it is well that there was an article 
voted there. 
RT - If I 118.Y' speak to that, because it seems to me an important part or the 
continuing violation as I saw it. The President even at the time that we 
were deliberating this was still in a position of not complying with a 
lawful request b7 the comittee constituted to conduct this inquiry. And 
I think as a general matter in a legislative inquiry into the executive, 
that it might be appropriate to test it in the courts. But the function 
of an impeachment inquiey is a dif!erent ballgame; there you are dealing 
with the very roots or our constitutional system and there is no other 
court involved in that decision, and what the legislative boey is doing 
there is not a legislative function. It. is a basic constitutional function 
and therffore its inquiry, it grounded upon an investigation which is to 
an impeachable offense, itself I think should be enforced ey thatbody- in 
order to get that information. otherwise, you frustrate the constitutional 
procedure. 
"WF - Basically, there was no court high enough to have jurisdiction. 
WC - That was the question that was raised as to where there is a right of 
appeal from the impeachment proceeding, and the only- one who came down in 
favor of that was Rauol Berger in his ·book. 
TR - He said perhaps there might be a right of appeal. 
we - Berger argued Tery clearly there was. 
RT - In retrospect, the amendment that I introduced on that morning, which was 
a last-minute drafting exercise in f'//:1 office just before coming over there, 
I did thi.nlc satisfactorily tie article III to articles I and II. It said, 
"the subpoened papers and things were deemed necessary br the collllllittee 
in order to resolve b7 direct evidence fundamental factual auestions re-
lating to presidental directions, knowledge, or appi,oval of -actions demon-
strated ey other evidence to be substnatial grounds for impeachment of the 
President." So you're tying in the function of the subpoena directly to 
impeachable offenses. And "then in refusing to produce these things Richard 
M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to waht materials were necessary 
for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the presidency against the lawful 
subpoenas of the House of Representatives, assuming to himself functions 
and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of impeachment." 
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TR - Ray, if you'll yield. I want to congratulate and compliment your state-
ment, which I thought was excellent, and this is very, very important, I 
think, in our meeting this morning. I don't agree with you, but I thought 
your statement was just excellent. As far as going to court, I was voted 
down, you know; I think we got six votes to go to court. 
RT - Reasonable men can disagree. 
TR - But I just wanted to add a postscript: that Alex Bickel, who I think knows 
more about it than Bill Cohen - he was a hell of a great ccn.sti1rutional 
expert 
CB - I hope so. 
WC - He does. 
TR - about ten days after that · vote was t·aken, came out with an article that 
said that we should have gone to court. Very strongly argu.i."lg from a 
constitutional standpoint and then shortly therea_-rter he died. But there 
was a very important part of the precedent-settil".g •••• 
iiC - Being punished, probably. 
CB - The whole question that you are directing us to is really- that we didn't 
just go far enough down the road. 
TR - No, two things, altho that was part or it. We didn't exhuast our tradi-
tional remedies. In not exhausting them, we in effect, took away som of 
the rights of our due process that I think are guaranteed to other possible 
persons to be held in contempt, in other words, witnesses. 'ie didn't pro-
tect them by us seeing that they had the traditional rights. And the 
second part is e.xecuti ve pri vi.lege. All during these procedil".gs, the 
Presidnet was arguing executive pri vi.lege. That is where you get into 
the court tests. Is it proper to test that argument by going to court? 
I think we would have won and settled it. I think the Supreme Court 
would have held that we did have a right, and executive pri vi.lege would 
give way in that case. We did not see fit to do so. 
CB - And swnmarily so. 
WG - I think your position was best expre:ssed on page 16 in the report where 
it reass, "Before the President's refusal to comply with eoaa:ittee sub-
peonas can be raised to the level of an impeachable offense, the co111-
mittee at a mi.nimml should wait until the House of Representatives has 
found that non-compliance tobe wilful, contemptuous, and illegitimate. 
Since the collllllittee did not pursue this course of action, it should not 
now seek to raise non-compliance to the level of a separate and independent 
act." 
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TR - Esactly. That is right. 
WC - That's really well stated. 
TR - Who made that - you? 
WC - Yes. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - I gather fro■ that, Bill, that you would have voted to include it as part 
of our article I. 
WC - Yes, I would have. 
TR - Ray, your statement was excellent. 
HF - It was a little different here, because even though I am the one who voted 
against article III, a week later I signed the concurrent views, supple-
mentary views that McClory had in favor of it. 
TR - How did you do that? 
HF - I was just concerned that •••• 
WC - McClory' s schizophrenia was contagious. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - The language that Bill just read about raising it to the level cf an im-
peachable offense, that concerned me. I didn't think that we'd adequately 
considered this, but I disagreed rlth you that we had to take those other 
steps. For as Ray said, it is the constitutional issue and not a legisla-
tive issue, and the sole, the word is right there, the sole responsibility 
was vested in the House of' Representatives. Ar.d I viewed a lot of this 
effort to bring in the courts as trying to share the burden, which we 
weren't entitled to share. But secondly, it is absolutely essential to 
the impeaehllent process that the House has access to the information thatit 
deems necessary. I think the clincher for me came upon the following 
Monday- with the release of the June 23rd transcript. This is something we 
had subpoenaed, and apparently had we receiTed it in Ma,, would have saved 
everyboc:17 an awful lot of anguish !or those two 110nths ! allowing. That I 
think was proof of the seriousness of the scope of the subpoena. power. 
For a 11atter of histor:,, it should have been an article of i!ipeachment. 
CB- Well, suppose that the tapes of the 23rd had not convicted the President 
but exonerated him. Now an impeachment inquiry and the reason we were 
subpoenaing would have been for evidance that would not haTe been sustained. 
Then the subpoena power would have had to stand alone, and would have been 
impeaching the President for aJ110unts to failing to cooperate in the con-
struction of the !leaffolding for his own execution. And that would not be 
right. 
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HF - But by then the House would not. have voted articles of impeachment. 
CB - But he argument that you keep advancing is the failure to cooperate and 
to comply vith the subpoena is of itself impeachable, and if that is the 
case, you can hang a man not for the crime but the failure to cooperate 
in his impeachment as such. 
WC - You could do it, but it would be vrong. You're saying "crime" •••• 
CB - I'm using the word rather loosely. 
RT - The point is, whetaer there is an attack on the constitutional system of 
government itself, at least that is what I think it is. That is what the 
question is. If there is some etldence to support the idea that the 
President is about to dissolve the Congress by an executive proclamation, 
because it is not longer needed to carry out the a!f ai.rs of the United 
States, and if the Congress hears or it and has s011e reasonable basis 
to conduct an i.nqui.r,- as to whether the President is i.rxieed about th 
issue such an order, I think the Congress would have a right to inquire 
into it and to subpoena whateTer documents the Congress needs to deter-
mine whether he is about to dissolve it. And if' the President refuses 
to honor that subpoena, even by the production o! ex cul.pa.tory material, 
then I think he has committed an impeachable offesne, because he is in 
effect den;ying to the Congress the sole power of impeachment. 
iiF - You can make the analogy in our wcrk just as well, Ray-, you don't have 
to make up this story. Let's say that he had just tota.l.ly refused to give 
us a damn thing, totally, and the courts had not come to our aid on the 
tapes, but they just stood mute totally and disregarded it, were would 
we have gone? 
CB - If they had denied jurisdiction •••• 
~ - Yeah, what we are saying is, what would we have done if we hadn't had 
the tapes? 
HF - The situation in India today, by virtue of havL"lg the majority of parlia-
ment, the prime minister can incarcerate political enemies. Now if this 
started happening here, and we did not have the impeachment power, we'd 
be in the position of the parliament or India. 
CB - If you don't have enough evidence to impeach the President aside from he 
has in his own limited domain, then you got no business impeaching him. 
HF - Even if you have identified with ~cision, as we did, the tape, the hour 
on which it was on tape, the people present at the conversation - not 
just a fishing expedition? 
CB - You' re entitled to access to it, but you are not entitled to impeach him 
for invoking executive privilege. 
:n' - I just don't think that executive privilege applies in an impeachment pro-
cess to the extent that it does in the normal legislative process. 
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TR - Who is going to decide that? 
RT - The Congress. 
HF - The House. 
TR - Who normally interprets the Constitution? 
RT - The court does, but the court doesn't in cases of impeachment, because 
impeachment ll8Y' include the court itself. What if you are impeaching the 
Chief' Justice o! the United States, instaed of the President? Would you 
refer the exercise of the power of subpoena. to this court? to the White 
House? 
w"F - To the executive branch? I agree with Ray there. 
CB - Even in this instance we hadn't gone that far. W'e hadn't gone to all 
the processes. 
RT - That is literally the legal argument: whether we had exhausted all the 
processes. 
TR - We had not, clearly. 
CB - That's right. 
WC - Doesn't the person, before he can be cited for contempt, have an opportunity 
to go before the House? 
TR - Yes, to make a statement. 
HF - The time, you remember, when we talked about contempt, we figured it would 
delay proceedings a year, a year and a helf. 
TR - All the safeguards normally accorded to a criminal defendant do the same 
thing. 
HF - But as a practical matter, we were reluctant to put it off. 
TR - As a practical matter, we should knock ourselves out to assure that he is 
given all, if not more, of the safeguard:, that the ordinary witness who 
has to appear enjeys. The important thing to remember is this was a 
separate article and must stand on its own feet. Forget the Watergate 
coverup, forget the abuse of power of the sensitive agencies. Are you 
going to impeach a guy when he asserts executive privilege and fails to 
produce? Here he is asserting executive privilege, he fails to produce, 
so instead of going thru your traditional contempt processes, you impeach 
him. That would never stand up. 
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HF - I think the example that Ray gave, if we had been thwarted from the 
start, and gotten nothing we'd asked for, you're saying then that we 
just would have said, "Yes, you're absolved"? 
TR - Assume that there isa threat, that the President is going to dissolve 
the Congress, but there is no evidence of it. I'm saying that in the 
past Presidents have exerted executive privilege and failed to produce 
certain things that they felt belonged to the exectuve. I think that 
doctrine gives way •••• 
HF - Do we !ind that in the Constitution? 
WC - Where is the doctrine of executive privilege spelled out in the Constitution? 
TR - It is not. 
HF - You're balancing a specific authority written into the Constitution, 
vested in the House of Representatives, with something that is implied 
from custom and practice and respected as an important principle but 
not specified. 
'iiF - But not on impeachable proceedings[?]. 
TR - No, it's never been. 
'iiF - This is not a normal information-seeking device for the Congress to find 
out about an authorization bill. 
TR - Now wait, let me make make it very clear. I think taht executve privilege 
gives way in this case. I am not agreeing with what the President did 
or what he asserted. What I am saying is he did assert it, and there has 
to be somebody to determine whether it should give way. I am saying the 
impartial arbiter would be the Supteme Court. 
HF - When you have the sole power, where is the arbiter? There is not any 
distinction or need. 
TR - I'll tell you, Rauol Berger would disagree. 
WF - Who's he? 
WC - That was a minority view. 
JM - I would agree that it would be appropriate under the circumstances to 
have a contempt proceeding, as a fore runner of impeachment, but should 
Congress determine that the refusal was unwarranted, then impeachment is 
our only remedy. 
TR - Exactly. 
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RT - That's it. 
TR - But you exhaust every avenue first.. 
CB - Now wait a minute. 
WF - You don't think you got to go to court, Jim? 
CB - It is not your only remedy, because you can go-. to court to enforce your 
subpoena. 
WF - We could send Fishbait Miller aft.er him. 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - How do you sacrifice your sole power of impeachment by perm.tting the 
court to determine whether or not certain infor:nat.ion should or should not 
be turned over? 
TR - Yeah, how does that affect your s,ole power? 
CB - I don't think the court would go that far. The court would have to deter-
llli.ne if it was related to our illl?!achment inquiry or we had a reasonable 
basis for it, not whether we were entitled to the information or not. 
That would probably be another quest.ion. 
JM - It might not have been an impeachment inquiry initjall.y. 
WC - The court would have to determine whether you are seeking relevant in-
formation, and in order to find cut what is relevant, they'd have to find 
out what is an impeachable offense. 
WF - If they do that, then they are .; !lvading your power to impeach. 
WC - That's correct. That was the argument that Jenner used to defeat Railsback' s 
motion to go to the court in the first place. 
HF - A solid argument. 
'liC - Once you get into the question of ::-elevancy, you have to define impeachment 
and then you have the court de.f'ir.ing an impeachable offense as opposed to 
the Congress. 
TR - Alex Bickel came right back and detroyed in effect Jenner's argument. 
we - I agree with Nora Ephron that you wear ice cream suits and that probably 
affected the validity of the argument. 
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RT - You knew that we didn't go into this depth at the t:u.e ve were doing the 
drafting. 
WC - No, we sure didn't. 
RT - It might be that we are overdoing it now, but I do think that the court 
decisions themselve~ have indicated that they should not be involved in 
the determinations which by nature ue political or assigned to another 
department of govermient, and clearly the impeachment process is assigned 
to the Congress. Baker vs. Carr, and the other eases see■ to support 
that, but whether t~y did or not, I still go back to the very practical 
point, that impeachment cuts ac~oss the departments of government. It 
addresses both the executive branch of 80vernment and the judicial branch. 
Most impeachments have occurred in the judicial branch, and if you are 
going to relate questions back to the judiciary when you are dealing 
with a process which goes to the judiciary- itself, that logically just 
doesn't follow. 
ns - Mell' I interrupt just a moment? Ray just said, "We did not go into this 
depth at the time." This is a significant tlri.ng. Do you all agree that 
this is hindsight now? 
WF - Yeah. 
ns - In other words, you didn't do this kind of thL"'lg a year ago? 
HF - Not this way. We expressed how we felt at that ti.me, but ve didn't as 
a group discsu.s at this depth whether or not •••• 
TR - No, but we were dea.ling with it, and Cohen had a statement and I had a 
statement , I argued it. I think everybody- was i.nTol ved. 
CB - WE had a substantial discussion of it when article III came before the 
committee. But as far as our drafting problem, as I remember, we really 
weren't concerned whether we were going to slip it into article II or 
not. We had been resolving it on a whole less esoteric level than that. 
~twas 
TR - No,/n,;y argument and Bill's argument against article III. But I think 
this discussion today is perhaps the most important as far as the future, 
in other words, it giTes an inkling to a.iv future House members who might 
have an impeachment problem, how to go about it. 
WF - I think that is the value of Article III having been voted on. It is im-
portant for the futrue, and that is the rationale of my basic turnabout 
on it, is that in retrospect I think to maintaL".l the viability of a 
potential investigation 1mder circumstances where you did net have the 
aid and comfort that we did - you know, hell, we had 1110re help than ;ruu 
can possibly imagine thru other fortuitous circumstances. 
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WC - My concern was that we had, in rtlT opim.on, a fair and rather ilmartial 
investigation. Let us suppose you go back to the Johnson impeachment. 
You got people like Benjamin Butler leading a charge against the Presidmrt., 
not, in rrr opinion, on valid grounds, but for purel.7 political reasons. 
Say you have a heavy majority in Congress who is opposed to the presi-
dential policies, whether it be impoundment or dismant.elling of OEO, or 
whatever, suddenly saying, "Here are our subpoenas, we got to bring it 
in or otherwise impeach you." 
JM - That's the danger. 
CB - Suppose you had two to one plus one. 
RT - That is exactly the hypothesis that Raoul Berger poses in discussing 
judicial review. And I want to say that your posiiion seems to me to be 
identical with President Ford's in the Douglas ease - that i.m;)eachaent 
is whatever you make it. Let me tell you Berger took Ford to task th.ere. 
HF - You raise a good point, just ll&ke it two to one plus one, three to one 
total..ly politia.lly hatchet job. But first of all, we do have a standard 
of what constitutes an impeachable offense, and what you're saying would 
not measure up. 
TR - You disagree with Ford, then? 
WF - I also disagree with it. 
HF - Secondly, to see your argument, you have this impeachable offense whihh 
is a crime against the government, the structure of the Constitution, and 
so forth. Clearly what you are saying it would not be that, but never-
theless, the Senate votes it, the trail held, and they eon-vi.ct the civil 
officer. Now the court of review is the people of the United States in 
the next election, as it is in so ma.my of the things we do. You are 
posing a most extreme position, a most extreme breakdown i."l the civilities 
that are essential to our system. 
WF - I agree with you,Ham. The only and final recourse is the people. 
TR - Ham, you are stating the argument very well. I think it is ver., important. 
WF - I think you could have a totally political impeachment. 
TR - Sure, that's po~sible. 
WF - When you get down to it, the system is no better than the people that are 
operating it. If you had even two to one plus one Republican, that could 
impach a Democratic President. 
CB - They would. 
rs - That was Butler for the record. 
LAUGHTER. 
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WC - I think one other point could be made so long as we are on this light 
note, and it's the one you made last night, Ray, that all of 'tl!! thought 
durimg the course of the impeachment, how in the world could someone, 
who knew he was being recorded, had his own taping system set up, and 
having engaged in the conversations he did and they did, how could they 
allow the recording to take place? Then when we compare it v!th what we 
did the past day, and what we are doing now, the answer becomes rather 
clear: that these will never see the light of day. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - I certainly want these edited before they do see the light of day. 
JM - Let's don't fail to recall though, contrary to the impression that I got 
a moment ago, that there was a brief discussion concerning these matters 
in our meeting, because it involved the position of Rails and Walter 
with reference to whether this should be an impeachable offense, and that 
discussion caused Ray Thornton in effect to develop an amendment to article 
III, which was presented to the Democratic caucus, and I guess to the 
full committee when it was considered. 
RT - Right, and it was adopted. 
CB - It was salutary in every sense of the word. It surely did imcrove it. 
RT - What it did, Tom, once again was to tie the right to have an article based 
on a failure to comply with subpoenas to two elements: one, that it was 
a clearly identifiable effort to get specific evidence related to an offense 
which was demonstrated to be an impeachable offense by other evidence. 
CB - It was the finding of a jurisdictional prerequisite for impeachment. Yeah, 
that is a good one. 
JM - I just looked at article III. I don't see that language ended up in it. 
RT - Yes, it does. 
JM - Yes, I see it now. 
RT - It, second, was necessary in order to resolve by difect evidence factual 
questions relating to presidential direction, knowledge or approval of 
action, demonstrated by other evidence, to be substantial grounds for i~ 
peachment. 
JM - Right. 
WF - Frankly, it just boggled my mind that we were going to get down to what 
at the time I considered a rather technical kind of legalistic approach 
to the matter, when we were dealing with these of'fenses--and in retrospect 
I changed my- position - but then these God-awful o!fenses li.~e obstruction 
of justice, abuse of sensitive agencies, and things that would be politically 
sexier by back home than failure . to comply with a subpoena issued by a 
bunch of' Democrats in the House ofRepresentati ves. And you know, how many 
times have you heard Eddie Ebert say, we got fifty subpoenas sit•ting on 
the Armed Services Committee, and the Congress doesn't honor suppoenas of 
the judicial branch, if they don't want to. 
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CB - Well, a propos of that, it just seems to me that there is one other factor 
that j~ified m::, TO'te against article III, and I still !eel this way. 
Our purpose in proposing the impeachment articles is to br...ng to the Senate 
the question whether the President should be rem<>Ted or not. And we kept 
adding articles to it, it complicated the trial, extended the trial, when 
it seems to me when we brought the issue clearly befor them in articles I 
and II. That was one of the reasons that I felt we should not get into 
Cambodia and all the others. 
TR - Right. 
JM - My conversation with Bill Blunt this morning [by phone J reveals that on 
July 12th I a:ssigned to h:i:m the duty or reviewing the Brooks article, 
which had j~ been received, and certain other articles that were in our 
possession. Now that cawses me to be curiows about Caldwell's recollectidm 
that you didn't get. those Doar proposed articles until Saturd.87 before we 
started. We got the Brooks articles on July 9th, and Bill's notes show 
that on Friday, July' 12th, we circulated the other articles. Blunt reviewed 
those articles and he said he spent Sunday the 14th doing that and then 
reported to me. During the course of that week we had no other permanent 
recollection at the moment or what we all did. Then leading up to our 
Saturday luncheon, which had been referred to, that would haTe been the 
20th, wouldn't it? When Walter and I and Bill Blunt were having lunch, 
and he indicated to me that I was wrong about he and John Labowicz working 
on Monday. They didn't. Rather, all day Tuesday and Tuesday night, which 
goes back to Tom's question about why I wasn't working on article II. As 
a matter of fact, Bill Blunt was over in the Library of Congress when I 
got out of that meet.ing, and as soon as I did, I said to him and John to 
start working on article II at that point. Along about 7:30 that night 
we had aproduct and John Doar ea.me over. He met and went over and over 
it, and about 9:30 we broke up. John Labowicz took our notes and drafts 
back over to the impeachment headqua.-ters, and then the next morning, 
probably this draft entitled 7:..21. •••• 
TM - Theee is a little note up there. Is that your handwriting? 
JM - No, that is not '!I'q writing. We have labeled here the second draft with 
the nUD1ber four a.r.d thirteen on it - that could have been the one we had 
earlier on when we aiet on Wednesday morning. 
TM - 7,-24-74. 
J1II - Right. That was Wednesday. 
TM - 13 , 17th draft. Certainly' we had that one during the cOUMe of that day, 
because as you will notice, we made those changes in certain words, 
striking out, anda few other places. And then look at the Donahue resolu-
tion; it reflects the principal note that we made on this draft of 7-21... 
TR - Yeah. 
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JM - So the indications are that this is the one we had to woric vith on 
Wednesday- morning, and it was prepared as a result or our lll!eting on 
Tuesday and my sessions with Blunt, Labowicz and Dear until Wednesday 
morning. 
CB - That is right. 
JM - So, unless we'd made two drafts on iiednesday prior to the Dona.hue reolu-
tion in preparation, this would ap~ar to be the one made i:mediately 
before the Donahue resolution. The differences are explained by the 
notations on the draft preceeding 7-24-74, which we vill refer to as 
what number, since we have several? 
TM - 13, I believe. 
JM - Number 13 seems to have been the one that we considered as a group prior 
to the final preparation of the Donahue resolution dur-i_ng the later after-
noon on Wednesday, and was handed to Donahue for introduction. Now did we 
meet once or twice on Wednesday? 
TM - 'We met twice on Wednesday, morning and afternoon, and we worked on article I. 
JM - OK. Blunt remembered delivering to us at Railsback's office copies of 
articles and it cuuld well have been this artilce II. 
TM- Late that afternoon. Yes, which we then polished up and prepared the 
Donahue version.[?] 
DS - Just for the record, it is on page 24 of our notebook. 
TM - One of the problems here is that Mr. Mann handed out r.is cL-aft Wednesday 
night. I took that and start-ed to work on it. He continued to work at 
his office on another draft, and then Frank Polk was working on the third. 
version. And so we had in circulation three different versions or article 
II, flowing back and forth. That accounts for a lot of the confusion of 
this thing. 
HF - M;r recollection is ~hen we got McClory's drafts deli· vered to us, we 
did not pay any attention to them. 
JM - Not at that particular moment. 
'iiiF - We did later on, though. He had pretty good input into it. To exhibit 
the problem that ;rou all had in drafting, here is the word "improperly." 
I remembered when we got to talking about it, that "imprope::-ly" just does 
not lie here. I mean, ve are not talking about an "improper" function 
by the executive, we are talking about "unlawful," so we took "improperly" 
out at that point. 
JM - Now that leaves us somewhat in the dark, and only rrry files may 
whether or not I shoved up Tuesday morning with an article II. 
and I have no independent recollection of having prepared one, 
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CB - On Tuesday mornir.g. 
JM - Yes. 
CB - My recollection is that you did not. 
TR - I don't think yuu did either. 
JM - I don't think I did either, because there was no reason for us to have 
identified abuse of power as the basis for an article. We were still 
mainly dealing with a multiple article idea at that point. 
WC - At what point was that, Jim? 
JM - On Tuesday morning when we first met. 
WF - We were talking about an article II at that point. 
WC - That is when we agreed that Mooney would take I and that you would take II. 
JM - Yes, that's right. 
iiC - We broke up that morning, saying, "OK, Mann, work on number II and Mooney 
work on I." That' s what I have in my notes. 
JM - And I did exactly that. The th..-ee people I mentioned from then until 
Tuesday [sic?], when we brought to the committee this number 13, and whether 
or not one was brought earlier in the day I just can't say at the moment. 
The one you have marked #11 just doesn't strike any notes with me at the 
moment. It may have been the fi.:-st one that was brought in the committee 
on Wedr.esday, but I just dnn't recall. P 'll get together with Bill Blunt 
and see if I can recall that. Bt..~ it is clear tc me from the typing and 
other things that this is the culmination of our work all day Tuesday, 
Tuesday llight, and iiednesday morning before presenting it ~o this committee. 
CB - You brought it in 10:30 Wedesday morning? 
JM - Yes, I either brought this, altho _there's some question here about whether 
or not maybe an earlier one was brought at that time, and this one was 
brought later in the day. I hadn't checked every little notation. 
"ll'F - It's got the date of July 24th, which was Wednesday. 
JM - But I haven't compared every little chicken scratch here against the Dona-
hue resolution, but this appears to be the one from which ve developed 
the final Donahue version. Most. of the little changes do correspond to 
the Donahue resolution. 
TR - Which number is that, the Donahue one? 
JM - It's t.he second one. For convenience I put it behind the 7-24-74 daaft. 
'!'R - I think you are right. 
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TM - I recall- on Thursday at the dirmer at the Capitol Hill Club vhen the 
group 1110re or less polished off article I, and I had penciled in the 
changes agreed on at that time, I went back to the office, ~ went 
downstairs to Frank Polle' s office, and started working on article II• 
And you, Mr. Mann, kept coming dovn and checking on us, until finally 
the meeting was over at around 11:30, at which time you came down again 
and we sat there until 2:30 in the morning rehashing. The one following 
the McClory article, #13 , is the one we just talked about. Then there.• s 
McClory's letter and article, and then theee's another one vith my name 
at the top, on 16, and one with Railsback' s name. [Going thru the 
drafts in the notebook]. 
HF - Exhibit page 57. 
TM - Yes, exactly. That's an article which Mr. Mann and Polle and I were working 
on late into the night. I recognize this is Kr,'/ writi,ng on the second pa8e, 
page 58. I know that for input we were using McClory' s article, his letter, 
and we were using an earlier draft or article II. Mr. Mann was kind of 
orchestrating the drafting, at least that evening. 
DS - On page 58, in the margin, I believe that is not your vriti.li.g, Tom? 
TM - No, looks like Railsback's. 
TR - No, it isn't. 
TM - I don't know whose it was. 
TR - I wonder if that's Hogan. 
CB - No. 
TM - Could be. 
KF - He was with you on the 25th, Thursday evening? 
TM - He was at the Capitol Hill Club, but he was not in Frank PoL'<' s office. 
TR - This is again what Hogan was concerned about, the specific mention of the 
FBI. That might be Hogan. 
JM - Well, I am not that positive that's the case, because upon looking at 12, 
as you have the11 arranged, I hadn't frankly studied this enought to see 
how each of these evolved from one to the other. Maybe you have, and 
that is why you remember this way. On second glance, there may- be another 
draft here that follows the Donahue a little closer. I see ve changed 
the paragraph numbers from the 13 to •••• 
TR - Yeah, but clearly the Donahue should be later. 
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JM - No question about that, yes. What the timeframe of 12 is I a.m not sure. 
CB - My notes say this: "On Wednesday we came back from luncheon, we then got 
into the abuse or power and that dra.f't has proTen to me to be extremely 
difficult. Now Jia Mann had two drafts with hi.s, and he is agonizing, 
he's gotten help !ro11 John Doar and others. We 're trying to put the draft 
in there with all the abuses of power, without putting in things we don't 
think are provable. In this regard, Jim Mann had with him tvo drafts. 
All o!' them had IRS for example. He evidently had thrown up his hands 
and told his office people, try again, and they were going to bring a 
third draft over." That accord with your recollection? 
JM - Yes, that does. Bill Blunt was bringing another one over. 
CB - Right. I got the copies of the dra..f't whihc we can prepare when we get 
a chance, but I don't know where they are.[?] 
TM - These are first. You notice draft 12, which has a "first" at the top, 
draft 13 has a "second." 
JM - Well, !'rankly, I think that I could sit down in an hour with Tom and we 
decide which ones of these cOIJles in what order, the ten or tvelve articles 
leading up to the Donahue resolution. 
CB - During the course of the deliberations, there was a moment 'When we decided, 
almost said, we just can't make it with abuse of power and then Tom [R] 
got on his high hor.se and said the IRS was enough for an article for abuse 
of power and pretty well did it, and we all !'ell in line with that. 
Walter was one of the first ones that said, i! I remember, "lfe just 
haven't fot enough for abuse of power." Railsback had second. thoughts 
on that. 
HF - Why not just. submit a memorandum to Don about ;rour papers and drafts? 
J1'! - It's just a little detailed co~arative drafting job which I would be 
happy to do and I will recover m:, other notes before I do it. I think 
we can line those up. But I think it is cJ:ear that we didn't have a 
written article for abuse of power until Wesnesday, at which time we can-
sidered two or three different ones leading up to the Donahue one, which 
we all agreed was still in draft or tentative form, and not a final product. 
And then it wasn't until later, it may have been that same day', that we 
had the indication !ro11 McClory abOlit his willingness to go along with 
an article, II, the abuse of power article, faithful execution of the 
laws - altho his letter to Caldwell that .'s in our file is dated Thursday. 
CB - That comes from Mcelory? 
JM - Right, that's from McClor.r. But we had it reported to us sometime along 
there that he was willing to do so. 
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CB - Well, rsr:, notes indicate that when we came back after lunch, ve had a call 
from Frank Polle that McClory was drafting his abuse of power. That's 
wednesday-. 
TM- I think lltlY'be Frank Polle at that time may have sent it over, a draft to 
the group, and later on the next day, Thursday, a letter went out to the 
rest or the people on the c?mmittee. 
,JM - I do recall a draft of some · .nature. It was going to "take care that 
the laws are faithfully' executed," and did not itemize the other. 
WF - Let me ask this, do you all think that McClory was committed to vote for 
impeachment at this point? 
JM - Yes, I do. 
WF - I don't think I really felt like he was committed until he voted. 
HF - He was circulating on the House noor an article m. I remember that 
and a memorandum supporting it. He gave them to John Rhodes to read 
one of those days on the House floor. 
TR - Yeah. 
JM - Let me recite in brief terms what happened later. On Sunday morning at 
10:00, after the final vote on article I the night before, there was a 
meeting in rrr:, office of McClory, Rodino, John Labowicz probably, Bill 
Blunt. McClory was there just very briefly and then left it in Frank 
Polk's hands to stick with me and we worked out the final detailed, precise 
language, altho what we had at that time I thought was almost ·a. final 
product. The next monni.J,.g, on Monday, I met in McClory' s office with the 
Republicans. It was Monday morning before we were starting to consider 
article II. We passed around the copy that we had and it was generally 
acceptable. I then went to the Democratic caucus in Ziefman's office, 
and with Frank Polk, went into the meeting, presented what we had, but 
we were not quite satisfied with the language of that last paragraphy, 
which was number 5. The last type-written article II in the book demon-
strates the problem I am talking about. 
That last type-written article II, paragraph 5, reads: "he misuses the 
executive power." I just wasn't satisfied with thatlanguage, and as Frank 
Polk and may-be Sarbanes were drifting along with me, the language, "in 
disregard of the rule of law" occured to me, and we went into Bill 
Saatuck' s [?] office and struck out what we had and wrote in "in disregard 
of the rule of law · he knowingly misused." We handed it to somebody real 
fast to retype it, because we were already walking toward the committee 
room. We had recessed the Democratic caucus and they all were waiting on 
us on the way in there. We killed a little time while it was retyped 
and copies and handed to Hungate and to Dutch [?] . It had been on Sunday 
afternoon that we had called Hungate from John Doar' s office, and offered 
to send it over to him, but I think we read it to him on the telephone, 
and he was going to come in at 8:00 in the mroning to take a look at it 
and be prepared. So that is the way Hungate got involved. 
WF - He was volunteered. 
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HF - Why was it that Sarbanes and Hungate were chosen, and that you yourself 
weren't interested in presenting the substitute? 
TR - Yes, that's agood. question. 
WF - He's smart, but he ain't dumb. 
LAUGHTER. 
JM - I think that says it as well as anything. In the first place, politically, 
I did not want to be out front. I think that is the most obvious answer 
I can give. Secondly, I knew that these were both people of ability and 
moderation and the image would be just the right one to present. 
WF - That's the way I view it too. 
JM - That' s the only real answer. 
CB - I think it was a pretty good choice, all things com,idered. It would have 
been hard for Kastenmeier or Edwards to put that over with the same con-
viction that Hungate did, the same standard. 
WF - It would have been hard for yuu all to go along with it. 
CB - Yeah, that's what I meant. 
'WC - Let me say this about Hungate: 'fll1" opinion changed. I w~n•t terribly 
impreseed with his opening statement because it was too light, flippant 
for the gravity of the proceedings. 
TR - Yeah, sure. 
'WC - And so he would not have been rrr:,- choice because of his Missouri humor, 
his Mark Twain quotes, and so forth. I would not have picked him, 
but I would have picked Sarbanes as opposed to ~ate, but then during 
the course of the debate, m:, op:L"lion changed on Hungate, because he cid 
a serious and good job. 
CB - I have a note that Bob McClor,y came over to me and asked me if I would 
be interested in introducing one of those things. I can't figure out 
which one it was, but you know I thought it was a little bit presumptuous 
and I didn't give that a whole lot of thought. 
LAUGHTER. 
CB - But where in the world did he get that from? 
TR - There is one other thing about McClory. I had heard that he vas really 
going to come out strong against article I. So I called him ar.d in effect 
said, "McClor,y, if you come out too strong against article I, I think we 
are going to make a monkey out of you. Here is what we have." -And I 
listed the chain of events where ve could prove that the President had 
not told the truth. 
WF - He~ s got to be schizophrenic to come out strong against article I and 
support article II. You got to be kidding. 
T A fT~tJl"ITli"Q 
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TR - I didn't want to hurt him. 
WF - I mean they are so wrapped up in each other,it is just hard to imagine a 
guy being for one and against the other, which ever way. 
,JM - It was rather interesting how Frank Polk threv himself into this task, 
working on article II, indicated to me that he rea.ll7 bel::..e.ed in it. But 
I say that as a preliminary to the fact that MeClory never really seemed 
to put his mind to this thing in rq presence. He passed it off to Polle. 
That happened on that Sunday morning and to a degree on Morxiay morning. 
There was so little said at the Monday morning meeting - j~ a cursory 
examination of vhat we did. 
HF - Before we read this article, I see thatJrhe final type-written version which 
appears following page 80 of the exhibits, there are some of our names in 
the margin. Article II, subparagraph one, it says "Rails" at the lert; and 
the next page, it says "Fish and Hogan" on the right hand side and "Cohen" 
at the botto■• Do you remember, Tom, how this came about? Were these 
the things we were to prepare ourselves for in the course of the debate 
on this article - were we going to speak in favor of certain aspects? 
JM - That is the ease. Whose writing is this? 
TM - That is mr writing. 
TR - I certainly did argue on the IRS. 
TM - Yes, it was somewhat in accordance with the proeedu..""9 adopted on article I 
that Friday night, on specificity, where we divided up in different areas. 
HF - I don't think we followed this, because I ended up speaking on the second. 
TM - No, I don't think we did. I think that was done just at the beginning of 
the discussion of that. 
CB - We really dirln't work over article II like we did article I in the committee. 
co~ttee TM - No, not at all. As a matter of fact, the . . / only met once. And I think 
this group sat down one time, that was Saturday morning, on article II. 
JM - But he is talking about publicly; ve didn't debate the details of it. 
TM - No. 
re - Do you recall Jerry Ziefman' s statement about the Neagles and chickens," 
in which McClory was the key figure in article II? What gave Ziefman the 
substance to. say that? 
1.F - What is he talking about? 
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SL - I'll read it. This is a speech Ziefman gave at the University of Santa 
Clara, after he had been there a while. 
WF - That is what made Rodino so damn mad. 
SL - He divides the Members into "eagles" and "chickens," and he said that 
"an eagle Rublican Congressman, Robert McClory, totally rejected the 
smoking gun theory, and became one of the principal architects of an arti-
cle of impeachment based on the President's abuse of power. Mr. Mcclory 
was also the draftsman and sponsor of an article based on the President's 
defiance of the committee's subpoenas. Yet Mr. McClory would have failed 
in his efforts without the vigorows support of such Democratic eagles as 
Jack Brooks of Texas and John Conyers of Michigan, both of vhom adamantly 
opposed acy Democratic strategy of delay as well as acy ef!ort to weaken 
the subpoena power of the con:zilittee." 
'WC - Could you enlighten us as to what the role of Ziefman was throughout? 
He was always kind of in. the shadows. 
TR - I don't know either. What was h:is role? 
WF - A kind of damn court jester, if you ask me. 
JM - Ziefman had no substantive input into the articles or into the debate or 
into the organization of the debate. Rodino might have been consulting 
with him. Ziefman would give an opinion every now and then, but it was 
always rather vague. 
WC - The press turned to him quite often, in ter.ms of inside information as 
to what strategy was being used, what the politics were. L vas just 
wondering if he had acy real active participation. 
JM - No, that I observed. 
RT - Well, I think I can concur with what you have expressed. It was not active 
or in any way anything other than an observer with casual coiments about 
the conduct of the proceedings. I think he was preoccupied with the 
Edmund Burke impeachment matter, and I think he was of a viev that the 
abuse of power vas the central queistion here, and he was looking for anyone 
who would support that view. But I'd go one step beyond that and say, 
without intending to be critical, that I felt that he had his feelings 
hnrt by not being in charge of the staff vork, and that many- of his actions 
resulted from that feeling that he had been pushed aside in this very 
important matter. 
TR - I think you are right, without a doubt. 
JM - I got the impression that he might have done some advising of Rodino on 
procedural matters and on publicity matters, but that's aboat all I could 
see. 
RT - Yes. What's your assessment of Ziefman's role, Walter? 
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w'F - Well, one, go back tQ before that, when Zie!man cecame general counsel to 
the committee - I thought that was a miserable choice. He was a nice 
enough guy, and he was always solicitous of me for some reason or seemed 
to be, and maybe he was that way with everybody, I don't know. But he 
never never made a point that made any sense. He never had any input into 
anything. All the comrl.ttee work he had any input in or control over, even 
before impeachment, floundered. He was no aid at all to Rodino. Now per-
haps in compiling the works, the documents, he did a helpful thing - you 
know, the first thing we got from the staff. It vas pretty good. But 
Ziefman was jealous of John Doar from the word "go". He was backbiting 
every time he could put a barb into the coD1Dittee staff, he was doing it. 
He was sowing discontent on our side all the while. This is a terrible 
thing to say, but I think the guy would have liked nothing better to see 
the whole thing blow up and made Dear look bad. It was totally sour grapes, 
I think,that he wasn't in charge of the proposition. 
RT - You said that a little more delicately than I would have, Walter. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - Wow, outspoken. That takes ca..~ of Ziefman. Now do1you have the Breslin 
[sic?] book answered satisfactorily? 
WF - Well, what I really got mad about is he didn't list me as a damn eagle 
in that statement right there. 
LAUGHEER. 
CB - How do you know? 
WF - I just read it. But I'm not a chicken either. ~hat's worse, I come out 
kind of neuter. None of us have been mentioned. we are neither the eagles 
nor the chickens. We don't have a...-zyt.hing to do rith impeachment. That 
shows how dumb he is. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - I think that is basically it. He was too close to a couple of people who 
didn't know what was happening. 
DS - On article II, are there any other matters that any one would want to 
co11111ent on? 
il'C - I wanted to put in at one time, as I recall, something on the Judge Byrne 
case and that was quickly dismissed. There wasn't too much support for it, 
but one item that had been talked about. 
JM - You know, there was a laundry list of maybe eleven areas, cut they were 
quickly cut down. Somewhere along the line, ar.d it will appear from these 
drafts, a decision was made, or I acquiesced in - I will put it that way 
immodestly - taking that subparagraph out of article II and letting a 
third article be drawn. I assume that John Dear drew the third article. 
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RT - I don't think so. It way be so, but I was really concerned vhen I saw 
article III as it appeared ready for introduction. 
TR - It centered a.round Frank Polle. 
RT - Because it did fail to tie the power of subpoena to an impeachment inquiry, 
I was concerned. It would have, in original form, as I recall, made the 
refusal to honor acy congressional subpoena any time an impeachable offeru!e, 
and this was so totally contrary to -aq views of the thing that I thought 
it was vital to make the change that we did make before that article was 
adopted. I would like to say that I did not feel at ~ tiae that there 
was any restraint on me to go ahead and support the theory that I had that 
this was an impeachable offense and that in no way was there any burden 
laid upon any o! us to retreat or withdraw from any position we felt 
strongly about. 
iiF - I think I was more just spent., phy'sieally spent, on getting all up for 
one and two, that I didn't think very hard about three. I really didn'.t. 
It just didn't measure up to what we were talking about in one and two 
in rrry mind at any time. 
ic'C - What was most offensive to me were McClory' s activities all the way through, 
all the caucwses we had, the closed sessions and so forth~ and then have 
him come out in f aver of article III as a major proponent. And Caldwell, 
we'll go back to that day- to the letter, when McClory was opposed to holdi.~.g 
him in contempt, and then raised it to a level of an impeachable offense, 
I thought was just too hypocritical. I did not even give it a.cy con-
sideration other than the debate that you and I had on that day. 
TR - I just like to add one thing about article II: as I see our final product, 
I do feel comfortable that we did have evidence as to all the numbered 
allegations to support our article. 
u'"M - There is one little point that so.ae of you can help me with. There was a 
crack in the coalition. And it came on article III. The little problem 
that developed, and I have not been able to recollect exactly what it was, 
but Railsback charged that there had been a breach of faith •••• 
TR - On article IV. 
RT - Article IV, the war issue, the bombing of Cambodia. 
JM - But you raised it before we voted on article III. But as I voted against 
article III for that reason. 
TR - Here is what I said, this is overkill, and in the debate on article III, I 
said, in all due res!)ect to my esteemed colleague from illinois, Mr. McClory, 
this is just overkill, this is not a serious offense. You [JM] didn't make 
up your mind on article III until the last minute, because as you were 
walking by, I said, "Jim, how are you going to vote on this, do you know 
yet?" And you said, "I think I am going to vote agai.ast it, but I just 
made up my- mind." That is when you were going to your chair. 
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WC - You're right on the time of that, because when Rails said the coalition 
was fragile, and it might shatter and so forth, I came back and said as 
far as this member is concerned, it is not a matter of how we vote on 
this issue, I am going to stick vith articles I and II and the coalition 
is OK. 
TR - But that was on the Cambodia article. 
WC - That was after you made the statement about the "fragile coalition." I 
got recognition as soon as possible. 
TR - That is the Conyers article. 
W'F - When did y-ou make that unfortunate statement about the "fragile coalition," 
a very poor choice of words? 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - I think we can all agree on that. 
TR - I still like it. It was a threat, I was trying to scare 'em. 
WC - You were locked in and we knew it. 
WF - Cohen, was that another case when he didn't check it out with you, did he? 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - Hadn't we already voted on articles I and II? 
TR - Let's find where I said it. 
WF - Surely you did not say that publicly, did you? 
TR - Yeah. 
WC - He sure did. 
CB - Hell, 1es. 
TR - I said it to threaten Conyer~. 
W'F - You ought ot use prepared statements. 
TR - I thought it was an excellent choice. 
CB - I don't think that fragility was eTer there, after you all had led us 
down that jurisdictional path •••• 
TR - It was strictly a threat. 
CB - After the procedural resolution, and we lost that, but we survived, I 
thought fragility was theoretical after that. 
HF - I didn't think it was fragile, myself". 
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WF - The only thing that was .fragile was our political futures! 
LAUGHTER. 
JM - I was partially motivated by a feeling that was probably based on 
Railsback's remark that there was some breach of faith asserted with 
reference to •••• 
TR - No, I never felt that at all. 
RT - I didn't realize that this division had occured. 
TR - I didn't occur. 
RT - I didn't think that it was either particularly fragile or for that matter 
really a coalition. I thuught the trouble was the word "coalition." To 
me it implies a little more wilfulr.ess or intention. 
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